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THE NATURE OF THE PROTECTION OF ARTISTIC
AND INDUSTRIAL DESIGNS
LEONARD MICHAELSONO
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, it has become increasingly clear through the decisions
rendered by the courts in design patent infringement suits, that the grant
of a design patent by the Patent Office does not necessarily include a grant
of a limited monopoly for the manufacture and sale of the article patented
which, theoretically at least, was sanctioned by the Constituion.' The
number of fatalities, that is, patents held invalid, in design patent litigation,
has been unusually high in recent years2 and has led to the agitation for
legislation or some form of relief to aid the designer against the copyist
and infringer. It is the purpose of this article to point out that basic
problems involved in securing adequate design protection and to suggest
a possible solution either in the form of legislative enactment or judicial
interpretation.
TIE ORIGIN AND LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF DESIGN PATENTS
The patent system stems from the well known provision set forth in
Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution" and although Congress enacted
several patent laws 4 prior to the adoption of the Constitution, it was not
until 18361 that Congress provided for the establishment of the Patent
Office and a system of examination. The design patent was established
in 1842 by the enactment of the Patent Act of 18421 and provided for
the grant of a patent for a limited time7 to anyone who invented or
produced "any new and original design for a manufacture, whether of metal
or other material or materials, or any new and original design for the
printing of woolen, silk, cotton, or other fabrics, or any new and original
design for a bust, statute, or bas-relief or composition in alto or basso
relievo, or any new original impression or ornament, or to be placed on
* B.S.M.E., University of Maryland; LL.B., Georgetown University Law School;
Patent Attorney, Washington, D. C.
1. U.S.CoNsT. Art. 1, § 8, gives Congress the power "to promote the progress of
science and useful arts by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their inventions and discoveries."
2. Walter; A Ten Year Survey of Design Patent Litigation, 35 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y
389, 390 (June, 1953).
3. See Note 1, supra.
4. Patent Act of 1790, 1 STAT. 109; Patent Act of 1793, 1 STAT. 318; Patent Act
of 1794, 1 STAT. 393; Patent Act of 1806, 2 STAT. 37, Patent Act of 1819, 3 STAT. 481;
Patent Act of July 3, 1832, 4 STAT. 559; Patent Act of July 13, 1832, 4 STAT. 577.
5. Patent Act of 1836, 5 STAT. 117.
6. 5 STAT. 543 (1842).
7. The Act of 1842 provided that the duration of the patent granted for a design
would be seven years.
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any article of manufacture, the same being formed in marble or other
material, or any new and useful pattern, or print, or picture, to be either
worked into or worked on, or printed or painted or cast or otherwise
fixed on, any article of manufacture, or any new and original shape or
configuration of any article of manufacture."
The Patent Act of March 2, 18618 eliminated fabrics from the list
of designs protected, but broadened the term of protection to three and a
half, seven or fourteen years at the election of the applicant.9  In the
Consolidated Patent Act of 187010 fabrics were once again given design
protection and the term "useful"" was inserted in the statute to define
the design to be protected .
The Patent Act of May, 190212 amended the design statute to eliminate
the anomalous term "useful" and substituted "ornamental" therefor. The
word "produced" was also eliminated from the statute and as a result the
1902 Act crystallized the modem definition of a design patent and authorized
the grant of a patent to "any person who has invented any new, original
and ornamental design for an article of manufacture . ..."13
THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF TIlE DESIGN PATENT LAWS
Early decisions.-The first basic interpretation of the design patent
laws was made by the Supreme Court in the leading case of Gorharn
Mfg. Co. v. White 4, wherein the court defined design infringement"5 and
furthermore established a definition for patentability, stating:
The Acts of Congress, which authorize the grant of patents
for designs were plainly intended to give encouragement to decora-
tive arts. They contemplate not so much utility as appearance,
and that, not as an abstract impression or picture, but an aspect
given to those objects mentioned in the Acts. * * * And, the thing
invented or produced, for which a patent is given, is that which
gives a peculiar or distinctive appearance to the manufacture or
article to which it may be applied or to which it gives form. The
8. 12 STAT. 246 (1861).
9. The optional term of protection is included in the law today and the Government
fees for filing and granting the design patent vary in accordance with the number of
years protection elected.
10. 16 STAT. 198 (1870).
11. See Ex parte Crane, 1869, Com. Dec. 7, Ex parte Solomon, 1869, Com. Dec.
56, and Ex parte Bartholomew, 1869, Com. Dec. 103, which held that utility may form
the basis of a design patent. But cf. Ex parte Parkinson, 1871, Com. Dec. 251, and
Ex Parte Seaman, 4 O.G. 691.
12. 32 STAT. 193 (1902).
13. For a comprehensive survey of the legislative history of design patents see
Hudson, A Brief History of the Development of Design Patent Protection in the United
States, 30 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 380 (May, 1948).
14. 81 U.S. 511 (1871).
15. The definition of infringement in design cases as laid down by the court in the
Gorham case is universally accepted as the test today. This test, normally referred to as
the "eye test," was defined by the court as follows: "We hold, therefore, that if, in the
eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, two designs
are substantially the same - - if the resemblance is such as to deceive such observer,
inducing him to purchase one supposing it to be the other -- the first one patented
is infringed by the other."
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law manifestly contemplates that giving certain new and original
appearances to a patented article may enhance its salable value,
may enlarge the demand for it, and may be a meritorious service to
the public. Manifestly the mode in which those appearances are
produced has very little, if anything, to do with giving increased
salableness to the article. It is the appearance itself which attracts
attention and calls out favor or dislike. It is the appearance itself,
therefore, not matter by what agency caused, that constitutes
mainly, if not entirely, the contribution to the public which the
law deems worthy of recompense. The appearance may be the
result of peculiarity of configuration, or of ornament alone, or of
both conjointly, but in whatever way produced, it is the new thing
or product which the law regards.
It was this interpretation given the patent act by the Supreme Court
that ultimately led to the Act of 1902 and the elimination of the word
"useful" 
.from the statute.10
A standard of invention had not been established by the courts in
design cases during these early years of the growth of designs, but the
Supreme Court in the case of Dobson v. Dorman," in holding a design
patent for a carpet valid and infringed, did attempt to establish a test to
be used in determining novelty and infringement. The court found in
the Dobson case that:
Undoubtedly the claim in this case covers the design as a whole
and not any part and it is to be tested as a whole as to novelty and
infringement.
The court of the second circuit in 189318, in holding a patent for a
watch case valid and infringed, made a liberal interpretation of the design
patent laws, comparing an inventor to an artist, sculptor or photographer,
and held that even though the design in suit did not present a wide
departure from other designs, it would be protected. However, the
Supreme Court in the same year in the case of Smith v. Whitman Saddle
Co.,19 was soon to establish a precedent for invention in design cases that
eventually resulted in the present agitation for legislative relief. The
Supreme Court in the Whitman Saddle case approved the rule in the
lower court decision of Northrup v. Adams,20 and for the first time predicated
design patentability on invention as in mechanical cases. The "genius"
theory was also first introduced into the concept of design patentability
16. Note discussion in 30 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 380, 389-391 (1948).
17. 118 U.S. 10 (1886).
18. Untermeyer v. Freund, 37 Fed. 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1889). The opinion by Judge
Coxe in this case recognized the principle of originality and the advantages that ought to
accrue to the originator of a design. He went on to say, "If it (design) presents a
different impression upon the eye from anything which precedes it, if it proves to be
pleasing, attractive, and popular, if it creates a demand for the goods of its originator,
even though it be simple and does not show a wide departure from other designs, its
use will be protected."
19. 148 U.S. 674 (1893). This case was the last patent suit involving a design
patent to be considered by the Supreme Court.
20. 18 Fed. Gas. No. 10,328 (E.D. Mich. 1877).
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when the language in the Northrup case was quoted by the Supreme Court
as follows:
To entitle a party to the benefit of the act, in either case, there
must be originality, and the exercise of the inventive faculty. In
the one, there must be novelty and utility; in the other originality
and beauty. Mere mechanical skill is insufficient. There must
be something akin to genius-an effort of the brain as well as the
hand. The adaptation of old devices or forms to new purposes,
however convenient, useful, or beautiful they may be in their new
role, is not invention. 2'
This unfortunate choice of language has since been regarded as the criterion
for design invention by many jurisdictions and has undoubtedly been a
contributing factor in the gradual decline of the protection of artistic
and industrial designs for their creators. The Supreme Court evidently
did not recognize at the time of the Whitman Saddle case any shades or
variations in invention. What was "akin to genius" was not defined but
it was definitely established by the court that the originality of the design
involved must be of a high order of invention involving "inventive genius."
Although the Supreme Court later in 191122 recognized that there were
orders of invention, and the second circuit several years later in 191323
suggested that the courts regard design patents in a lesser light than utility
patents, the general view has been to regard design patents on the same plane
as utility patents and to employ the same test of invention.2 4 Accordingly,
the courts have normally attempted to maintain a high standard of invention
in design cases25 since the Whitman Saddle case and have continually
referred to the "genius test" 26 in seeking the answer to whether invention
was present in developing the design in question.
21. It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court in the Whitman Saddle case
did not actually intend that their language be interpreted that a combination of old ele-
ments could never be patentable. Mr. Justice Fuller speaking for the court went on to
say: "The exercise of the inventive or originative faculty is required, and a person cannot
be permitted to select an existing form and simply put it to a new use any more than
he can be permitted to take a patent for the mere double use of a machine. If, however,
the selection and adaptation of an existing form is more than the exercise of the imita-
tive faculty and thd result is in effect a new creation the design may be patentable."
The court in this case found no infringement but did not rule on validity, leaving the
lower court's definition of invention undisturbed.
22. Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated Rubber Tire Co., 220 U.S. 428 (1911).
The patent in suit related to a mechanical device (tire), the court stating that the "art
was crowded" and further that degrees of change are recognized by the law and invention
may be divided into primary and secondary degrees.
23. Dominick and Haff v. R. Wallace & Sons Mfg. Co., 209 Fed. 223, 224 (2d
Cir. 1913). See also Untermeyer v. Freund note 18, supra; Smith v. Stewart, 55 Fed.481 (E.D.Pa. 1893). S24. Smith v. Whitman Saddle, note 19, supra; Galion Iron Works & Mfg. Co. v.
The Buffalo-Springfield Roller Company, 108 F. Supp. 811 (S.D.Ohio 1952); Capex
v. Swartz, 166 F.2d 5 (7th Cir. 1948); Applied Arts Corporation v. Grand Metalcraft
Corporation, 67 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1933).
25. E.g., see Moore v. C. R. Anthony Co., 198 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1952); General
Time Instruments Corp. v. U.S. Time Corp., 165 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1948); Zangerle
& Paterson Co. v. Venice Furniture Novelty Mfg. Co., 133 F.2d 266 (7th Cir. 1943).
26. The Whitman Saddle case referred to invention as being something "akin to
genius," but many of the courts when applying the genius theory state that the inven-
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Raising the standard of invention.-In 1941 the Supreme Court
handed down the highly controversial decision of Cuno Engineering Corp.
v. The Automatic Device Corp.,27 wherein the court sought to maintain
the high standard of invention established in the \Vhitman Saddle case.
In the Cuno case, the court emphazised that invention must be the result
of a "flash of creative genius" and that "perfection of workmanship" was
not enough to define invention. Mr. Justice Douglas speaking for the
court said:
We may concede that the functions performed by Mead's com-
bination were new and useful. But that does not necessarily
make the device patentable. Under the statute the device must
also be an "invention" or "discovery" (and) it has been recognized
that if an improvement is to obtain the privileged position of a
patent more ingenuity must be involved than the work of a
mechanic skilled in the art . . .. That is to say the new device,
however useful it may be, must reveal the flash of creative genius,
not merely the skill of the calling.
The court in attempting to raise the standard of invention '- set down
such a stringent standard for patentability that it is little wonder a Supreme
Court justice was moved a few years later to remark, in the oft quoted
language, that the "only patent that is valid is one which this court has
not been able to get its hands on." '  Although the Cuno case did not
involve a design patent, the general attitudc of the court and the standards
for patentability set forth therein have been reflected in the decisions
of the lower courts in design cases30 as well as in mechanical cases,3' and
thus it followed that during the ten-year period subsequent to the Cuno
tion must have resulted from "a flash of genius" or that there must be the exercise of
"inventive genius." See e.g., liucter v. Compco, 179 F2d 416 (7th Cir. 1950); Gold
Seal Importers, Inc. v. Morris White Fashions, Inc., 124 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1941);
Neufeld-Furst & Co., Inc. v. Jay-Day Frocks, 112 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1940); A. C.
Gilbert Co. v. Shemitz, 45 F.2d 98, 99 (2d Cir. 1930).
27. 314 U.S. 84 (1941). For a critical discussion of the Curio decision see Nov.
1943 1J, PAT. OFF. Soc'y.
28. Actually the Supreme Court's standard of inventions had already reached such
heights that during the ten-year period between 1927 and 1937 the Court held 17 patents
invalid and 2 valid. See footnote 2 in Judge Frank's concurring opinion in Picard v.
United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632 (2d Cir. 1942). A compilation of the decisions
rendered by the Supremne Court from 1930 to 1950 reveals that of 34 patent cases in
which invention was raised and decided 28 were invalid and 6 valid. See 32 J. PAT.
OFF. Soe'y at 429, 430 (1950).
29. Dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Jackson in Jungersen v. Ostby and Barton
Company, 335 U.S. 560 (1949).
30. E.g., see Cold Seal Importers, Inc. v. Morris White Fashions, Inc., note 26,
supra; General Time Instruments Corp. v. U.S, Time Corp., note 25, sura; Zangerle
and Peterson Co. v. Venice Furniture, note 25, supra.
31. Judge Learned Hand, long recognized as one of the leading judicial authorities
en patents, was moved to remark in Picard v. United Aircraft, note 28, supra, decided
less than six months after the Curo case, "We cannot, moreover, ignore the fact that
the Supreme Court whose word is final, has for a decade or more shown an increasing
disposition to raise the standard of originality necessary for a patent. In this we recog-
nize 'a pronounced new doctrinal trend' which it is our 'duty, cautiously to be sure, to
follow, not to resist'."
THE NATURE AND PROTECTION OF DESIGNS
decision, out of forty-eight adjudications of validity of design patents,
thirty-seven were declared invalid. 32
To add to the confusion, the Supreme Court in the case of The
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp.,'
decided in December of 1950, once again denounced the low standards
of invention presumably sanctioned by the Patent Office and the lower
courts. Although the majority opinion in the A & P case did not set
forth any new standards or tests for invention, it was emphasized therein
what is required to produce a patentable combination of elements, and
that a uniting of old elements with no change in their respective functions
"obviously withdraws what already is known into the field of its monopoly
and diminishes the resources available to skillful men." However, it was
the concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas that caused the storm of
controversy following the decision.34 In his opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas
used the following language:
The attempts through the years to get a broader, looser conception
of patents than the Constitution contemplates have been persistent.
The Patent Office, like most administrative agencies, has looked
with favor on the opportunity which the exercise of discretion
affords to expand its own jurisdiction. And so it has placed a
host of gadgets under the armour of patents-gadgets that obviously
have had no place in the constitutional scheme of advancing
scientific knowledge.
The effect of the A & P Case.-Although the A & P case also related
to a mechanical patent, the lower courts, as in the Cuno case, construed
the general intent of the Supreme Court to maintain a high standard of
invention whether the invention be mechanical or design. The judicial
thinking set forth in the A & P decision was very shortly reflected in the
decision of the lower courts. The District Court for the Southern District
of New York in December 1950, less than a month after the A & P
decision, in the case of The Kono Mfg. Co. v. Vogue Optical Mfg. Co.,
Inc.,35 held a design patent for a spectacle frame invalid, citing the A & P
case as emphasizing that a high standard of invention is essential to obtain
a patent. Judge Kauffman, in the Kono case, cited both the majority
and concurring opinions in the A & P case and stated:
The Supreme Court most recently expressed its views on the
subject of invention in patents with great clarity. In the case of
32. See note 2, supra.
33. 340 U.S. 147 (1950).
34. For an analysis of the A & P decision, see Siggers, Comments on Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Co. v. Super-market Equipment Corp., 33 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 83 (Feb.,
1951); Holbrook, Science v. Gadgets, 33 J. PAT. OFI. Soc'v 87 (Feb., 1951); Broder,
Gadget Patents, 33 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 102 (Feb., 1951); Michel, The Standard of
Invention and the U.S. Supreme Court, 33 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 297 (April, 1951); Green-
berg, 'Gadget' Patents, 33 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'r 569 (Aug., 1951); Oberlin, Science Versus
Useful Arts, 33 ). PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 399 (June, 1951); Stokes, Gadgets To Promote the
Progress of Science and Useful Arts, 36 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 508 (July, 1954).
35. 94 F. Supp. 251 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
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The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company v. Supermarket
Equipment Corporation, the Court, in denying the patentability
of a mechanical device because it was a mere aggregate of known
elements, emphasized the high standard of invention required
to obtain a patent. Mr. Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion
stated that the grant to Congress in Article 1, Section 8 of the
Constitution of power to permit patents to be issued was for the
purpose of promoting the progress of science and useful arts. He
pointed out that: "Every patent is the grant of a privilege of
exacting tolls from the public. The Framers plainly did not want
those monopolies freely granted. * * * (T)hrough the years the
opinions of the Court commonly have taken 'inventive genius' as
the test.
He emphasized that the Patent Office has too frequently
departed from the constitutional standards which are supposed
to govern the granting of patents.
In another recent district court case, Acton Mfg. Co. Inc. v. Louisville
Tin & Stove Co.,36 a design patent for a portable beverage cooler was held
invalid, the court quoting freely from the A & P decision and particularly
Mr. justice Douglas' concurring opinion. The court in the Acton case
emphasized that a high standard of invention must be maintained by
the judiciary and went on to say:
Every improvement, either in utility or design, even to the extent
of radical changes in appearance and function, is not such evidence
of inventive genius that the most recent workman can claim a
monoply of production under the patent laws.
To my mind the decision in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.
v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., supra, sharply directed the
attention of the trial courts to the fact that decisions in cases
such as the one at bar have drifted far beyond the intent of the
legislative patent protection enactments. It was pointed out in
the opinion in that case: "The concept of invention is inherently
elusive when applied to combination of old elements.
With the rebuke of the patent system so apparent in the A & P
case, the lower courts have been reluctant to find invention in even the
most outstanding designs and the record reveals that since the A & P
decision, out of twenty design patents adjudicated by the lower courts,37
fifteen have been declared invalid 8 and five valid. 9 With the record
36. Action Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Louisville Tin and Stove Co., 116 F. Supp. 796, 798(W.D. Ky. 1953). For other recent decisions reflecting the lower court's reaction to
the A & P case see 33 1. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 569, 574, 575 (Aug., 1951).
37. Figures compiled from decisions published by U.S. Patents Quarterly.
38. Of the 15 patents declared invalid, 4 decisions were rendered by the Courts of
Appeal. These were Hopkins v. Waco Products, 205 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1953); Burgess
Vibrocrafters v. Atkins Industries, 204 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1953); Moore v. C. R.
Anthony Co., 198 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1952); Tupper Corp. v. Tilton & Cook, 101
U.S. PAT. Q. 1 (1954).
39. The same patent was held valid and infringed by the third and fourth Circuit
Courts of Appeal. See Sanson Hosiery Mills, Inc. v, Warren Knitting Mills, Inc., 202
F.2d 395 (3d Cir. 1953); and Glen Raven Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Sanson Hosiery Mills,
Inc., 189 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1951).
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of the courts showing an overwhelming tendency to invalidate design
patents, the thought naturally arises whether a valid design patent does
exist under the present judicial thinking. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit apparently believes there does not, setting
forth in the recent case of Charles D. Briddell, Inc. v. Aiglobe Trading
Corp.,40 that "to obtain a valid design patent is exceedingly difficult," It
would appear, however, that the Patent Office does not subscribe to this
rather pessimistic view and during the one-year period ending July 28,
1954, issued 2635 design patents. 41  Why then, does the Patent Office
continue to issue this relatively large number of design patents in view of
the judicial interpretation of the patent laws? The answer, apparently,
is in the different standards42 of invention employed by the Patent Office
and the courts. Thus, the Patent Office in arriving at a decision to grant
a patent determines patentability on a more or less relaxed standard, while
the courts invoke a rigid standard for invention.
What is invention?-By statute, a design must be new, original,
ornamental and involve the element of invention.48  Ordinarily, it is
not difficult to determine whether the design involved is new, original
and ornamental since the design only need differ somewhat from the
prior art to satisfy these requisites. However, in determining whether
invention is present in the design over the prior known designs has defied
even the most judicious minded bodies. At least one court has openly
professed its difficulty in determining design invention4 4 and other courts
have lamented that the standards used are "vague and difficult of
application.' 4  In seeking to find invention in a design, the courts, as
well as the Patent Office, have repeatedly emphasized that it is not
sufficient to merely show that the design i -novel, ornamental, or pleasing
in appearance, 6 but that the design must reveal a greater skill than that
exercised by the ordinary designer who is chargeable with knowledge of
the prior art.47  The validity of the design must be tested by the appearance
40. 194 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1952). See also United Metal Goods Mfg. Co. v. La
Belle Silver, 104 F. Supp. 790 (E.D.N.Y. 1952).
41. Figures compiled from Official Gazette of the U. S. Patent Office.
42, The word "standard" is actually used by the courts to denote "tests" as well as
in a relative sense, that is, a high standard or a low standard.
43. See 66 STAT. 805, 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1952).
44. The Court of Customs and Patents Appeals in In re Bigelow, 194 F.2d 550
(C.C.P.A. 1950) said "it is difficult, if not impossible to set out a hard and fast rule
of what constitutes design invention." Also see In re Warren, 194 F.2d 715 (C.C.P.A.
1951).
45. Gold Seal Importers, Inc. v. Morris White Fashions, Inc., 124 F.2d 141 (2d
Cir. 1941); Neufeld-Furst & Co., Inc. v. Jay-Day Frocks, Inc., 112 F.2d 715 (2d Cir.
1940).
46. General Time Instruction Corp. v. U.S. Time Corp., note 25, supra; Burgess
Vibrocrafter, Inc. v. Atkin Industries, Inc., note 38, supra.
47. Nat Lewis Purses, Inc. v. Carole Bags, Inc., 83 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1936). Also
see 1 WALKER, PATENTS 426 (Delter's ed. 1937).
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of the design as a whole,48 but mere mechanical skill of the artist is no
more sufficient to constitute inventive art in the case of the design artist
than in the case of the engineer. 49 The reassembling and regrouping of
old elements that perform no new function, and if within the skill of the
ordinary designer, is not invention. 0  However, the reassembling or
regrouping of familiar forms and decorations may constitute a patentable
design, if a new result is obtained,51 and if ingenuity is displayed in
producing something new, which imparts to the eye a pleasing impression
even though it be the result of uniting old forms and parts, such production
is a "meritorious invention."'52 In a recent case,58 the court held a patent
for a child's toilet seat valid and infringed and said that even though "each
element in a patented design is old does not of itself negative invention
since patentability may reside in the manner in which the elements are
combined." A design, to be patentable, moreover, must not be dictated
by mechanical or functional requirements, 4 but the mere fact that the
design involves some mechanical or utilitarian function does not rendei
it unpatentable65 In the case of Glen Raven Knitting Mills v. Sanson
Hosiery Mills,56 the court, in holding a design for a lady's stocking valid
and infringed, took a more liberal view of validity, declaring that secondary
factors57 supplementing the usual tests for patentability should be considered
and gave considerable emphasis to the fact that the design in question
was commercially successful. However, it is well established that commercial
success without invention will not make patentability. Although these
48. Glen Raven Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Sanson Hosiery Mills, Inc., note 39, supra.
Matthews & Willard Mfg. Co. v. American Lamp & Brass Co., 103 Fed. 634 (D. N.J.
1900). Graff Washboume & Dunn v. Webster, 195 Fed. 522 (2d Cir.. 1912).
49. Battery Patents Corp. v. Chicago Supply Co., 111 F.2d 861 (7th Cir. 1940).
50. Capex v. Swartz, 166 F.2d 5 (7th Cir. 1948); Howell Co. v. Royal Metal Mfg.
Co., 93 F.2d 112 (7th Cir. 1937).
51. Protex Signal Co. v. Feniger, 11 F.2d 43 (6th Cir. 1926).
52. In re Park, 181 F.2d 255 (C.C.P.A. 1950); Forestek Plating & Mfg. Co. v
Knapp-Monarch Co., 106 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1939); Try Me Beverage & Compound
Co. v. Metropole, 25 F.2d 138 (E.D.S.C. 1928); Ashley v. Weeks-Numan, 220 Fed.
899 (2d Cir. 1915); General Gaslight Co. v. Matchless Mfg. Co., 129 Fed. 137
(S.D.N.Y. 1904).
53. Columbia Protektosite Co. v. Great American Plastics Co., 112 F. Supp. 39
(D. Mass. 1953). Also see Laskowitz v. Marie Designer, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.
Cal. 1954), where a design patent for the contour chair was held valid and infringed.
54. Hopkins v. Waco Products, Inc., 205 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1953); Circle S
Products Co. v. Powell Products, Inc., 174 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1949); Smith v. Dental
Products Co., Inc., 140 F.2d 140 (7th Cir. 1944).
55. Hopkins v. Waco Products, Inc., note 54, supra; In re La Montagne, 55 F.2d
486 (C.C.P.A. 1932); In re Barber 8I F.2d 231 (C.C.P.A. 1936).
56. 189 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1q51).
57. The secondary factors considered by the fourth circuit were set forth in the
lower court's opinion in Sanson Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Glen Raven Knitting Mills, Inc.,
95 F. Supp. 134 (M.D.N.C. 1950), and are (a) commercial success, (b) universal copy-
ing, particularly by defendant, (c) wide public acceptance, (d) numerous disclosures
cited by defendant, (e) fruitless efforts of prior inventors, and (f) acceptance of licenses
and consent judgments.
58. Battery Products v. Chicago Co., note 49, supra; Western Auto S pply Co. v.
American National Co., 114 F.2d 711 (6th Cir. 1940); In re Staun, 53 F.2d 545
(C.C.P.A. 1931).
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theoretical rules for determining design invention are acknowledged by the
courts, there still exists a sense of confusion as to what constitutes patentable
invention. With the question of inventions and patentability in such a
confused state, and with various courts and tribunals each applying a
different standard to determine invention, it is reasonable to presume that
subsequent litigation will continue to result in invalid patents. If the
Patent Office were to adopt the judicial standard of invention, the high
mortality rate in design patents may be decreased, since such a standard
would allow only a mere handful of design patents to be granted during
the course of a year. Yet, there are many designs for artistic and
industrial developments which have novelty and originality and that
should be afforded some form of protection.
The apparel arts-A special problem.-In some fields, such as the
wearing apparel arts, the problem is acute and although design protection
through patents is theoretically the only relief available,59 the courts have
completely denied such relief80 and have even advanced the proposition
that patent protection for fabrics is not within the purview of the patent
statutes.6 1 Since the courts have denied the dress designers any effective
relief against the design pirates, it has bcome a common and accepted
practice in the garment industry for a skilled designer to develop highly
styled designs at great expense, only to have the less principled competitors
pirate the designs and introduce them on the market at a lesser price. 62
Although other fields have recently been afforded some relief through
patent protection," it is still a calculated risk to bring suit on a design
patent.84
SOLVING THE PROBLEM
Judicial interpretation.-In view of the judicial history of the unsuc-
cessful attempts to obtain adequate protection for designs, what then can
59. Design protection has been denied in the form of copyrights. See Verney v.
Rose Fabrics Converters Corp., 87 F. Supp. 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Kemp & Beatley v.
Hirsch, 34 F.2d 291 (E.D.N.Y. 1929)1 and relief through suit for unfair competition
has also been declared unavailable. See Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279
(2d Cir. 1929).
60. Novak v. Graysons, 49 U.S. PAT. Q. 487 (1941); Neufeld-Furst Co., Inc. v.
Jay-Day Frocks, 112 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1940); Mary Muffet, Inc. v. Loma Dress, $nz.,
39 F. Supp. 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Roseweb Frocks, Inc. v. Moe-Feinberg-Mor Wisen,
40 F. Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); White v. Lenore Frocks, Inc., 120 F.2d 113 (2d
Cir. 1941).
61. 1n White v. Lombardy, 40 F. Supp. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), Judge Inch de-
clared that a dress design may be "new, original and attractive and yet not be patentable"
and "it makes one wonder how any patent on such dresses can be obtained provided true
invention is required." For a discussion of the particular problems involved in the
wearing apparel art, see 27 IND, L.J. 130 (1952).
62. See GOTSIIAL and LiEF, THE PIRATES WILL GET You (1945), for a more
detailed discussion of piracy in the garment industry.
63. E.g., the recent decisions in Glen Raven Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Sanson Hosiery
Mills, Inc., note 39, suprra; Columbia Protektosite Co. v. Great American Plastics Co.,
note 53, supra; Laskowitz v. Marie-Designer, Inc., note 53, supra.
64. See notes 37-39, supra.
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be done to provide the protection so urgently needed in this field? A
possible solution is for the courts to take judicial notice of the fact that
design invention is normally not of the same order as mechanical
invention.6 5  That is, the same standard of invention applied by courts
in mechanical cases should not be applied in design cases, since the
processes employed to arrive at a new design by the very nature of the
subject-matter involved is less demanding than that for mechanical
inventions. 0  Moreover, differences in design are less pronounced than
differences in mechanical movements, and a slight change in design over
the prior art may be of a high order of design invention, but a slight
change in a mechanical movement over the prior art may be nothing more
than that which could be accomplished by one skilled in the art. Of
course, the standard of invention would again be determined by subjective
reasoning, but if this doctrine could be established by judicial interpretation,
the presumption of validity 7 of a design patent granted by the Patent
Office would be given more than just lip service and the burden of
overcoming the presumption would weigh heavily on one asserting
invalidity. It is realized that this solution, as advocated, is not capable
of immediate application and would require a period of indoctrination,
and, moreover, would more than likely require a Supreme Court inter-
pretation. However, in view of the resistance to change in the design
patent laws by legislative enactment, it should be noted that in a thirty-year
period, some thirty-five bills have been introduced into Congress 8 which
were designed to modify or to abolish the present system of design patent
protection and to provide protection in other forms such as, for example,
by copyright. None of the bills were enacted into law.
Supporting the "different standard of invention" theory is the theory
that it was the true intent of Congress in enacting the first design Patent
Act of 1842 not to require invention in designs in the same sense as in
mechanical devices. 'Thus, it has been advocated in some instances,"
although unsuccessfully, that the true intent of Congress in enacting the
Patent Act of 1842, was to provide for the issuance of a patent to any
one who "invented or produced . . . any new and original design for a
manufacture."70  It is argued, therefore, that the design need not require
65. See note 23, supra,
66. Ibid. But cf. S. Dresner & Son v. Doppelt, 120 F.2d 50 (7th Cir. 1941).
67. 66 STAT. 812, 35 U.S.C. I 282 (1952). "A patent shall be presumed valid.
The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent shall rest on the party asserting it."
68. For a list of the bills introduced into Congress, see l)erenberg, Copyright No-
Man's Land: Fringe Rights in Literary and Artistic Property, 35 1. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 770,
784-788 (Nov. 1953); see also Weikert, Design Piracy, 19 IND. L.J. 235 (1944).
69. 5. Dresncr & Son v. Doppelt, note 66, supra; Zangerle & Peterson Co. v. Venice
Furniture Novelty Mfg. Co., note 25, supra; In re Faustmann, 155 F.2d 388 (C.C.P.A.
19460. Emphasis supplied, In Gorharn Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511 (1871), the court
specifically referred to the production of the design. The court said: "And the thing
invented or produced, for which a patent is given, is that which gives a peculiar or
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invention to be patentable as long as it is produced within the meaning
of the statute. The courts have rejected this theory and in the case of
S. Dresner & Son v. Doppelt,7 specificially noted that the Act of 1870
changed the wording of the statute to "invented and produced."72  The
court went on to say:
By the terms of the present act, patentable design for an
article of manufacture must be characterized by invention of a new,
original and ornamental design. The mere production of such a
design is not sufficient. The word 'produced' which appeared
in the earlier enactments has disappeared from the present Act,
and there is no authority to substitute it for the word 'invented'
and thereby qualify the usual concept of invenition.
It is encouraging to note that Congress in the Patent Act of 195273
did attempt to establish a unifomi standard for patentability. In Section
103 of the Patent Act, the conditions to be satisfied before a patent may
be granted are set forth as follows:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not
identically disclosed or described as set forth in Section 102 of this
title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made
to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the
manner in which the invention was made.
The standard is defined in Section 103 in a negative sense; that is, the
subject-matter must not have been obvious to one having ordinary skill
in the art. Actually, this standard is not new and has been applied by
the courts for more than 100 years 74 and the courts today have continually
enunciated the rule." However, this standard taken with the second
sentence of Section 103 combines to form an objective test that provides
a basis at least for the courts establishing a uniform standard of invention.
The second sentence in Section 103 specifically sets forth that it matters
little in what manner the invention was made and thus attempts to diminish
the judicially-established "flash of genius test" which test in effect did
distinctive appearance to the manufacture or article to which it may be applied, or to
which it gives form. It, therefore proposes to secure for a limited time to the ingenious
producer of those appearances the advantages flowing from them."
71. 120 F.2d 50 (7th Cir. 1941).
72. Emphasis supplied. Note also the interpretation of the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals in In re Faustmann, 155 F.2d 388 (C.C.P.A. 1946). The word "pro-
duced" has since been removed from the statute by the Act of 1902 and the word
"discovered" substituted therefor.
73. Enacted into law January 1, 1953.
74. The standard was first announced in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 I-low. 248
&tU.S. 1850). For a thorough probe into the effect of § 103 of the Patent Laws see
oodman, The Effect of Section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952 upon the Patent Laws.
35 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 233 (April, 1953). Also see Spielman, Some Constitutional
Aspects of the Patent Statutes, 36 J. PAT. OFr. Soc'Y 237 (April, 1954). Marans,
Some Aspects of the Patent Act of 1952 as lnter reted by Published Decisions. 36 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'y 482 (July, 1954).
75. See note 47, suprd.
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not look to the state of the art but to the manner in which the invention
had been made. At least the invention resulting from a logical period of
development now stands on an equal footing with invention resulting from
a "flash of genius."7tm  Although the Patent Act of 1952 attempted to
establish an objective standard for determining patentability, it, unfortu-
nately, did not define what constitutes invention in a design. The require-
ments for patentability of a design, as set forth in Section 171 of the
Patent Act, still provide that the design, in addition to being new, original
and ornamental, must involve invention, and it is not unlikely that the
courts in subsequent litigation will continue to maintain their extremely
high standards for design invention.
Legislative enactment.-In the absence of judicial acknowledgment
of a different order of invention between designs and mechanical devices,
if any relief is to be afforded the artistic and industrial designer, it must
result from legislative enactment. 7 Although prior attempts at amending
or eliminating the design patent laws have proved unsuccessful,7 more recent
and vigorous agitation79 for statutory change may well result in the changes
advocated during the past thirty years.
1. Copyrights as a source of protection.-Since the subject-matter of design
patents involves artistic creations as well as industrial designs, many of
the proposed legislative changes have suggested either the incorporation
of all designs in the copyright laws or a copyright type of design patent
law. 0  Such proposals have been given thorough consideration by pro-
ponents and opponents alike, particularly in view of the limited requirements
for registration of a copyright 8' and the relatively long period of protection
76. The report of the louse Judiciary Committee which interpreted the newly
codified Patent Act made the following note with reference to § 103 - "The second
sentence states that patentability as to this requirement is not to be negatived by the
manner in which the invention was made, that is, it is immaterial whether it resulted
fron a long toil and experimentation or from a flash of genius."
77. The courts have for many years recognized the need for legislative aid in secur-
ing protection for designs. See e.g., Nat Lewis Purses, Inc. v. Carole Bags, Inc., 83 F.2d
475 (2d Cir. 1936); Roseweb Frocks, Inc. v. Moe-Feinberg-Mor Wiesen, Inc., 40 F.
Supp 579 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); White v. Lombardy. 40 F. Supp. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1941);
White v. Leonore Frocks, Inc., 120 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1941).
78. See note 68, supra.
79. E.g., see 52 Micmi L. Rv. 33 (Nov. 1953); 35 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 389 (June
1953); 35 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 690 (Oct. 1953); 66 IIARv. L. REv. 877 (1953); 21 GEo.
\VAsn. L. REv. 353 (1953).
80. For arguments pro and con on specific bills introduced into Congress to change
or abolish the design patent laws, see 17 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 995 (Dec., 1935); 10 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'v 297 (May, 1928); 8 J. PAT. OFF11. Soc'y 425 (May, 1926); 7 J. PAT. OFF,.
Soc'y 540 (July, 1925).
81. Copyrights are registered in the Copyright Office of the Library of Congress
upon application therefor when publication of the work of art appropriately marked is
shown. Two copies of the work are deposited in the Copyright Office and a certificate
of registration is issued after a cursory examination as to whether the subject-matter is
iroper for registration. The only requirement for registration is originality but there is
no examination as to the originality of authorship. If the subject-matter is proper for
registration, the Register of Copyrights must, as a matter of right, issue the copyright,
there being no discretionary power vested in his office.
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therefor. s2 A further advantage in the copyright form of protection is
the low cost88 involved upon filing for registration. Moreover, obtaining
a design patent is considerably more time-consuming than is registering a
copyright84 since a period of examination is required to determine whether
the design in question meets the requirements for patentability.
The copyright law specifically provides for the registration of "works
of art"85 and thus have been interpreted to include many of those designs
that could also be the subject of the design patent laws.80  Hence, it is
argued that since there is an acknowledged existing overlap between the
two laws,8 7 all designs should be incorporated into the copyright laws. 88
82. Co yrights are registered for a period of 28 years and may be renewed for an
additional 28 years, 63 STAT. 154 (1947), 17 U.S.C. 0 23 (1952).
83. The normal expense accrued in filing for registration of a copyright is the filing
fee of four dollars. The expenses accrued in filing application for a design patent are
dependent upon the amount of preparatory work done by an attorney, which should
include a pre-filing search of the "prior art". The Government fee for filing an applica-
tion for a design patent is $l0, 15 or $30, depending upon the term of protection
elected.
84. Normally a waiting period of five to eight months may be expected before a
design patent issues after the application is filed in the Patent Office, although the period
varies in accordance with the work load and may be shorter or longer. See 52 MicH.
L. REv. 33, (Nov. 1953) footnote 23. Many of the design applications filed do not
issue on the first action by the Patent Office since the Examiner may raise the question of
lack of invention that must be argued, or a procedural point may arise with which com-
pliance is necessary for the issuance of the patent. It is interesting to note that the
Patent Office in the fiscal year 1952-1953 set a goal of two months for taking action on
a case after receipt of application. However, this goal was never attained. The report
of the Commissioner of Patents follows: "A total of 4,868 applications was pending in
the design divisions at the beginning of the year. From 3 to 3 months elapsed from
receipt of application or amendment to office action. The objective was to reduce the
backlog by 3,000 cases in the design divisions and to take action within two months of
receipt of applications. By the end of the year the backlog had increased to 4,908 cases,
and average pendency to action had lengthened to about 4 months, reflecting a greater
number of new applications and a considerably smaller number of disposals than expected."
[Annual report of the Commissioner of Patents for the year July 1, 1952 to June 30,
1953. 36 J. PAT. OF. Soc'y 555, 556 (Aug., 1954).]
85. 61 STAT. 652 (1947), 17 U.S.C. § 5(g) (1952), Works of Art; Models or
designs for works of art. The complete classification of works for registration is as fol-
lows: (a) books, including composite and cyclopedic works, directories, gazeteers, and
other compilations; (b) periodicals, including newspapers; (c) lectures, sermons, addresses(prepared for oral delivery); (d) dramatic or dramatico-musical compositions; (e) musical
compositions; (f) maps; (g) works of art; models or designs for works of art; (h) re-
productions of a work of art; (i) drawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical
character; (j) photographs; (k) prints and pictorial illustrations including prints or labels
used for articles of merchandise; (1) motion-picture photoplays; (m) motion pictures
other than photoplays.
86. E.g., monuments, Jones Bros. Co. v. Underhoffler, 16 F. Supp. 729 (M.D.
Pa. 1936); dolls, Wilson v. Haber Bros., Inc., 275 Fed. 346 (2d Cir. 1921); indicating
chart, Taylor Instruments Companies v. Fawley-Brost Company, 39 F.2d 98 (D.C. Cir.
1947); glassware, William A. Meier Glass Company, Inc. v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp.,
95 F. Supp. 264 (W.D. Pa. 1951); candle holder, Pellegrini v. Allegrini, 2 F.2d 610
(E.D. Pa. 1924); playing cards, Richardson v. Miller, 20 Fed. Cas. No. 11,791 at 722
D. Mass. 1877). Also see WEILL, COPYRIGHT LAw 84, 85 (1917); 52 MicH. L. REv.
33, 48 (Nov. 1953).
87. For discussion as to the overlap of design patent and copyright laws, see 27
IowA L. REv. 250 (1951); 52 Micn. L. Rzv. 33 (1953); 9 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 298(19271; 7 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 540 (1925); 35J. PAT. OFF, Soc'Y 627 (1953). -88. Williams, Copyright Registration of Industrial Designs, 7 J. PAT. OFF SOC'
540 (1925). The author at this early date recognized the "misfit and failure" of the
design patent laws. "The fundamental error of Congress was in classifying industrial
designs with mechanical invention instead of with literary and artistic work."
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The courts have recognized the overlapping of the laws but normally have
restricted the author or designer to an election of one law, which election
barred the protection of the other law. 9 The overlap between copyrights
and design patents was brought into sharp focus in the recent Supreme
Court decision of Mazer v. Stein.°0  In the Mazer case a statuette had
been registered in the copyright office under Section 5(g), Works of Art,
but was subsequently fitted with a base and then sold commercially as a
lamp. The infringers slavishly copied the statuette and also sold the article
as a lamp with a base attached. The issue then arose whether the statuette
was the proper subject-matter for a copyright, since it was embodied in
an industrial article in its final form. 91  Obviously, the statuette with the
base attached would have been the proper subject-matter of a design patent
if the creator had so chosen to elect this avenue of protection. It is
also likely that the statuette without the base, and as registered as a
copyright, was within the statutory class of articles protected by design
patents. 2 The court in holding the copyright valid and infringed declared
the statuette as registered was not improper subject-matter for a copyright.
The court then said:
We find nothing in the copyright statute to support the
argument that the intended use or use in industry of an article
eligible for copyright bars or invalidates its registration. We do
not read such a limitation into the copyright law.
Nor do we think the subsequent registration of a work of
art published as an element in a manufactured article, is a
misuse of the copyright. This is not different from the registration
of a statuette and its later embodiment in an industrial article.
The court further recognized the co-existence of the copyright and patent
laws and indicated that a twilight zone did exist in the protection afforded
by the two laws, stating:
89. Rosenthal v. Stein, 205 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1953); Korzybski v. Underwood &
Underwood, Inc., 36 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1929); In re Blood, 23 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.
1927); Jones Bros. Co. v. Underhoffler, 16 F.Supp. 729 (M.D. Pa. 1936); Louis de
Jonge & Co. v. Breuker & Kessler Co., 182 Fed. 150 (S.E.D. Pa. 1910); cf. Taylor Instru-
ment Companies v. Fawley-Brost, 139 F.2d 98 (D.C. Cir. 1947); Wilson v. Haber Bros.,
Inc., 275 Fed. 346 (2d Cir. 1921).
90. 347 U.S. 201 (1954). The Mazer case was considered by the Supreme Court
after a conflict resulted in the lower courts. The copyright for the statuette was de-
clared invalid in Stein v. Expert Lamp Co., 188 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1951), and Stein
v. Bemaderet, 109 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Mich. 1952), but was held valid in Rosenthal
v. Stein, 205 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1953) and Stein v. Mazer, 204 F.2d 472 (4th Cir.
1953).
91. The petitioners urged that, "The design patent laws should be interpreted as
denying protection to artistic articles embodied or reproduced in manufactured articles.
They say: 'Fundamentally and historically, the copyright office is the repository of what
each claimant considers to be a cultural treasure, whereas the Patent Office is the
repository of what each applicant considers to be evidence of the advance in industrial
and technological fields'."
92. Although § 171 of the Patent Code provides for the grant of a patent for "an
article of manufacture," it is recognized that design patents embrace articles classified in
the "fine arts." Note that Design Division B of the Patent Office has jurisdiction over
articles relating to "Household, Personal and Fine Arts" - see Official Gazette of the
U.S. Patent Office.
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We do hold that the patentability of the statuette, fitted as
lamps or unfitted, does not bar copyright as works of art. Neither
the Copyright Statute nor any other says that because a thing is
patentable it may not be copyrighted. We should not so hold.
In view of the judicial history of design patents, it is not unlikely
to reason that if the creator of the statuette had chosen the design patent
law as her means of protection, the resulting infringement suit would
have resulted in just another invalid patent. It can be understood then,
that the proponents of the copyright system of registration for designs
have greeted this case with no little acclaim. Although the doctrine in
the Mazer case may afford the artistic designer of works of art relief
against the plagiarist, it should be pointed out that the court in this
case also touched on the salient features of the objections to incorporating
all designs into the copyright law. Despite the fact that the copyright
office has interpreted the copyright laws to permit registration of those
works embodying "mechanical or utilitarian aspects"9' 3 the court in the
Mazer case strictly interpreted the applicable copyright regulations, noting
that "Regulation Section 202.8 . . . makes clear that artistic articles are
protected in 'form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects.' See
Stein v. Rosenthal, D.C., 103 F. Supp. 227, 231."1 4
Although design patents may not depend upon utility for patent-
ability, 15 it is apparent that the vast majority of designs as, for example,
cigarette lighters, furniture, fixtures, fabrics, etc., are employed in a
functional sense and thus may be classified as industrial designs as
distinguished from works of art, which include statuary and pictures.
It is these industrial designs that under the present definition of copyrights
are incapable of being protected. Even if the copyright law were to be
amended as advocated to include industrial designs, protection may be
afforded the designer against the proven plagiarist or copyist but, due to
the very definition of copyrights, there would undoubtedly arise serious
obstacles to adequate overall protection that would leave the designer
in no better position than he is today. "Unlike a patent, a copyright
gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection is given only to
93. "From 1909 to 1948 the Regulations . . . provided that works of the fine arts
would be accepted . . . but that utilitarian objects . . . would be rejected. In practice,
however, an object of artistic conception in a standard arm form - e.g., sculpture or
painting - has not been denied registration merely because of its possible utilitarian as-
pects. . . . In 1948 the Register . . . concluded that the long-existing Regulations
adequately defined only the extremes of permissible and non-permissible registration,
leaving in doubt the works which fall intersticially between the two extremes." Brief
of the Register of Copyrights as Arnicus Curiae to the United States Court of Appeals for
the 4th Circuit, Stein v. Mazer, 204 F.2d 472 (4th Cir. 1953) at 11-12. See 52 MicH.
L. REv. 33 (Nov. 1953), footnote 152.
94. Copyright Regulations published in 37 CODE FED. Racs. § 202.8 (1949), reads
as follows: "Works of art (Class G)-(a)-ln General. This class includes works
of artistic craftsmanship, in so far as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian
aspects are concerned, such as artistic jewelry, enamels, glassware, and tapestries, as
well as all works belonging to the fine arts, such as paintings, drawings and sculpture."
95. See note 54, supra.
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the expression of the idea-not the idea itself."08  That is to say, there
can only be protection afforded the specific article copyrighted and it is
well established in copyright law that "the copyright protects originality
rather than novelty or invention-conferring only 'the sole right of multiply-
ing copies.' ,7 Thus, if a similar article is produced by independent effort,
there is no infringement of the copyright 8 or, stated in another way,
"absent copying there can be no infringement of copyright."' 9 Another
basic objection to a copyright type of law for designs is the absence of
examination as to originality. 100 Although dispensing with the examination
of the prior known designs would materially speed up the period of registra-
tion and would provide quick registration for those designs of a seasonal
character where immediate protection is necessary,' 0' a more irreparable
harm may be imposed upon those who would invest large sums of money
in financing an industrial design only to find a comparable article already
being commercially produced. 10 2
2. A suggested solution.-One solution to the matter would be to retain
the present system of granting patents for designs, which includes the
examination of the prior art, but to amend the design statute to properly
define the requirement for design invention found therein. Novelty,
originality and ornamentality are the elements that distinguish one design
over another, and it is these elements that should by statutory definition
define design invention. It is known that many courts, in adjudicating
design patents, have found that a design was novel, original and ornamental,
but upon employing the judicial standards and tests to determine invention
could not justifiably sustain the validity of the patent in suit. 03  The
presence of originality, ornamentality and novelty in a design should
be sufficient to define invention and to warrant the issuance of a patent
96. Mazer v. Stein, note 93, supra. Also see F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Contem-
porary Arts, 193 F.2d 162 (1st Cir. 1951), Ansehl v. Puritan Pharmaceutical Co., 61
F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1932)- Fulmer v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 1021 (Ct. Cl. 1952);
Muller v. Triborough Bridge Authority, 43 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
97. Mazer v. Stein, note 93, supra. Also see Jewelers Circulating v. Keystone
Publishing, 281 Fed. 83, 94 (2d Cir. 1922).
98. Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 Fed. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
99. Mazer v Stein, note 93, supra. Also see White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo
Co., 209 U. S. 1 (1908); Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249
1903); Alfred Bell & Co., Ltd. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir.i951); Christie v. Cohan, 154 F.2d 827 (2d Cir. 1946); Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d
464, 468-469 (2d Cir. 1946); Ansehl v. Puritan Pharmaceutical Co., note 96, supra.
100. Meyers, Shall Industrial Designs Go "Out of the Frying Pan Into The Fire"?
8 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 425 (May, 1926); Rossman, Proposed Registration of Designs, 17
J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 995 (Dec., 1935).
101. E.g., dresses - See 7 J. PAT, OFF. Soc'y 540 (July, 1925), for one view in
favor of dispensing with the examination period. "Novelty and priority of production
form no part of the equities of an original design."
102. The necessity for an examination to obtain an exclusive right in an art was
found by the Supreme Court in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880) - "To give to the
author of the book an exclusive property in the art described therein, when no examination
of its novelty has ever been officially made, would be a surprise and a fraud upon the
public."
103. See note 46, supra.
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since such elements in the field of designs attest to the addition of the
"stockpile of knowledge" in the particular art to which the design may
relate. Invention in any instance is only relative, but in the realm of
designs, the slightest change in appearance over that which had been
known before may well constitute an outstanding design achievement,
yet by present judicial standards would be found to be totally lacking in
invention.
3. A further solution.-Although a statutory definition of design invention
may increase the area of protection for designs, many objectionable
features inherent in the present system of granting design patents would
remain in the law. The solution would appear then to lie in the enactment
of a completely new form of design law. The new law may be designed
to protect those articles classified as industrial designs and could be
modeled somewhat after the type of law protecting industrial designs
in Great Britain.' 0 ' The problems involved in creating a new type of
protection for industrial designs are many and complicated, for it is
apparent that such a law to be effective must be a hybrid of copyright
and patent protection. These problems may be classified into four main
groups or headings as follows:
1. Subject-matter to be protected;
2. Procedural method of obtaining protection;
3. Nature of protection including the definition of infringement
and period of protectability; and
4. Source of the authority for the law.
In some preliminary discussions'0 5 the subject-matter sought to be
protected has been generally defined as including any article of manufacture
relating to features of shape, pattern, configuration or ornamentation of the
article and intended to give it an attractive, artistic or distinctive appearance.
It would appear that this definition completely covers the field of industrial
designs and furthermore includes fabrics. However, since this definition
of subject-matter sought to be protected does not attempt to distinguish
beween the subject-matter registered under the copyright law, there will
be an overlap in protection of certain designs under the present law. It is
believed that this is unavoidable due to the interpretation of the protectable
104. The British Registered Designs Act of 1949 provides for the protection of
designs which are defined as "features of shape, configuration, pattern or ornament
applied to an article by any industrial p rocess or means . . . which in the finished article
appeal to and are iudged solely by the eye." The industrial design is registered for five
years with two optional five-year renewal periods. No showing of invention is required,
it only being necessary that the design be "new." The Designs Act expressly excludes
artistic works of art which are protected by the Copyright Act of 1911. (In an attempt
to distinguish between copyrights and industrial designs, the Copyright Act of 1911
provides that no protection will be afforded a design when it is reproduced in more than
50 single articles. However, there is still an acknowledged overlap in protection. See
MICH. L. REv. 33, 60 (Nov. 1953).
105. The Coordinating Committee of the National Council of Patent Law Associa-
tions is currently considering a draft of a proposed bill that is intended to amend the
present design laws.
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subject-matter given border line designs by the copyright officd and the
dictum set forth in the Mazer case, supra. In such instances of overlapping
protection, the avenue of protection should be elected by the designer, but
he should be fully cognizant of the differences in protection afforded by
the two laws and particularly the differences in proof in finding infringe-
ment.106
A registration system for registering industrial designs would appear to
be the answer for affording the industrial designer adequate design pro-
tection, and in addition would essentially eliminate the heretofore known
delays so commonly associated with the granting of a design patent.
In contrast with copyrights, the industrial designs under the proposed
law should be subjected to a test of originality or novelty, 1 ' which test
would necessarily include an examination'05 to determine the state of
the prior known designs. As provided under the present patent laws,
the registration of a design should confer upon the designer a monopoly,
restricted to a limited period, giving him the right to exclude others from
making or selling an article similar in design to the article registered. The
period of protection may vary depending upon continued use of the design
and could be restricted to three to five years.0  In order to protect the
public, a penalty of forfeiture of the right to register could be imposed upon
a designer if he neglected to register his design six months after the
publication or indication of public use thereof.'n
The test for infringement under the proposed law should be similar
to the tests now employed by the courts under the design patent laws."'
Thus, if two designs resemble one another, so that the ordinary purchaser is
induced to purchase one design believing it to be the other, then the first
one registered is infringed by the other. Unlike the copyright laws,
wilful copying should not have to be proved to make out infringement.
Evidence of similarity should be sufficient to establish infringement. The
public should be presumed to be charged with knowledge of the prior
106. In order to find infringement of a copyright, copying must be proved. See
discussion infra for suggested proofs of infringement under the proposed law.
107. Novelty can only be defined with relation to the prior known designs, thus if
the design so closely resembles the prior art designs in appearance so as to be considered
the same design by the ordinary purchaser, the registration should be denied.
108. Providing an examination of the prior designs for industrial designs subject to
a registration system was also advocated in the Sirovich Bill (H. R. 5859 introduced in the
74th Congress, 1933). See GoTsnAL and LIEF, ITHE PIRATES VILL CET You (1945).
See also Dohn, Designs - Patents or Copyrights, 10 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 297 (May,
1928). This author at an early date recognized the need of a registration system for
designs which included an examination.
109. The term of protection under the present Design Patent Law is either three
and one-half, seven or fourteen years, and is determined by the election of the inventor.
110. The applicant for a design patent must by signed oath swear that his invention
was not "patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or
in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the
application for a patent in the United States." 66 STAT. 797, 35 U.S.C. 102 0 (b)
(1952).
Ill. See note 15, supra.
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registered designs and if independent effort produces two similar designs,
the first one registered will be infringed by the other. Many details of
form and procedure of the new law that cannot be included in this
discussion must also be thoroughly considered and, moreover, since the
registration system is proposed, a completely new form of grant will have
to be developed.
The source of authority for enacting the proposed industrial design
law should probably be derived from the author and inventor clause'12
of the Constitution. The interstate and foreign commerce clause has
been suggested as a possible source of authority, but in view of the liberal
interpretation given the term "authors" by the copyright office," ' and
in view of the closely analogous protection granted to authors and inventors
by Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, it is believed that this latter
clause provides the constitutional sanction for protection of industrial
designs.
CONCLUSION
The area of protection afforded the artistic and industrial designer has
been unduly limited by judicial interpretation of the design patent laws,
and it therefore has become increasingly apparent that there is need for
reform thereof. If the designer is to receive judicial aid in protecting
his art, an entirely new form of design protection must be introduced
into the law. The doctrine set forth in Mazer v. Stein, supra, is indicative
that the judiciary will validate designs provided there is sufficient basis
in the law. It is now squarely up to Congress then to provide this
long sought for protection so urgently needed in the field of designs.
112. See note 1, supra.
113. See note 93, supra.
